One of the elements of that storm was the partial repeal ofGlass-Steagall, coupled, however, with the partial repeal of the BankHolding Act [both in Gramm-Leach], and made deadly by the CommodityFutures Modernization Act of 2000 and the subsequent vacuum intowhich fell Enron’s “off the books” activities, the burgeoning ofunregulated credit default swaps backed by zero insurance reserve, andthe unregulated “securities” called collateralized debtobligations. See the various press releases from SEC, especially2001-2002, and their joint releases with the Commodities FuturesTrading Commission, to get the sense of “oh, wow, this is gonna begreat” that was pervasive.
Oneresult was government insurance of deposits in commercial banks thatcould then be leveraged in very risky and unregulated transactions. “What does seem impractical, however, are the current arrangements.Anyone who proposed giving government guarantees to retail depositorsand other creditors, and then suggested that such funding could beused to finance highly risky and speculative activities, would bethought rather unworldly. But that is where we now are.” MervynKing, Bank of England, October 2009.
Thereare other historical elements. When we gave Citibank thevariance – the “temporary” approval – to merge with TravelersInsurance years earlier in contravention of the existing Bank HoldingAct we were playing with this fire. When we began the incrediblebipartisan push for 100% mortgages to barely qualified borrowers wewere creating tinder to be fed into the unregulated CDOs that were inheavy demand because of a tidal wave of cash looking for a home. When FanFred participated in the Goldman-Sachs model of wealthcreation we further implicated the future governmental response.
Irecognize some compelling arguments for looking elsewhere. See
Again,consider the banks in western countries that were NOT shaken to theirroots, that were not crying for bailouts. “Canada’s experienceseems to support those who say that the way to keep banking safe isto keep it boring — that is, to limit the extent to which banks cantake on risk.” The dreaded Krugman, 2-1-10
Iconcede that is an argument for regulating risk taking, not forregulating the wall between “commercial” and “investment”banking, per se. However, the contribution from tearing down thatwall is that investment banking runs a far chancier, and more global,set of risks than is required for good lending practices. The set ofrisk averse regulations historically applicable to lendinginstitutions would stifle an investment banker. Even now we see theindustry fighting against maintaining mere ten per cent in reserves. I remember when 18% was typical for a local bank.
Ipose that separation would be a net good and reduce future risk inthe way suggested by Mervyn King.
Fora world class primer on line refer to:
This is conveniently found through the “baselinescenario” link on the right of your page.
I’m outta here! At least, for now. Hook ’em Horns!
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